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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:,J:l:IITA T1JOM, ·r11dow of Daniel 
~ . ..L')ffi, 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 19162 
115. 
~OANE HALL TRUCKING, STATE 
INSURANCE FUND and INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a Review of a Final Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying petitioner death benefits under 
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Laws. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY 
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the 
Ad~inistrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order denying petitioner's request for death benefits on 
the grounds that petitioner was not a "dependent" of her 
deceased common law husband. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to review, 
~c3e and remand the order of the Industrial Commission of 
1h Eor the purpose of awarding death benefits to petitioner 
as the lawful widow and dependent, actual and presumed, ~f her 
deceased husband. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Daniel Lawrence Tuom died on September 5, 1981 of 
multiple injuries sustained from a truck accident on August 26, 
1981 in Coalville, Utah. The accident occurred during the 
course of decedent's employment with respondent Duane Hall 
Trucking Co. 
Petitioner, Mrs. Donni ta Tuom, filed her claim for 
dependent benefits on March 12, 1982, alleging that she is the 
surviving and dependent spouse of decedent. ( R. 2.) 
The State Insurance Fund responded to petitioner's 
claim by denying that she was the wife of decedent because Utah 
law does not recognize common law marriage. (R.3.) An amended 
answer further clarified the Fund's denial of benefits by 
implying that decedent entered into a second common law 
relationship in Utah and, therefore, decedent had unilaterally 
dissolved the prior common law relationship with Donnita Tuom. 
(R.10, R.37.) 
At the hearing held July 27, 1982, petitioner 
submitted significant evidence showing that: (a) Mrs. Tuom was 
married to the decedent in a common law relationship commencing 
in the State of Idaho in 1971; (b) Mrs. Tuom and decedent then 
moved to the State of Virginia and lived together as man and 
wife for approximatey four years; (c) Mrs. Tuom and deceden~ 
next moved back to the State of Idaho for one and one-half 
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;ears; and finally (d) Mrs. Tuom and decedent moved to the 
State of Oregon where they continued to live as man and wife 
,inti l Mrs. Tuom separated from her husband in June of 1980 
hecause Daniel Tuom was seeing another woman, thus making the 
present relationship intolerable. (R.22.) Donnita left Oregon 
to stay with her family in Idaho. Several months later, Daniel 
Tuom left Oregon to meet with "the other woman" in the State of 
Utah where he became employed with the respondent, Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc. 
During the time of their separation, the decedent 
visited with Donnita on at least three occasions, lasting from 
approximately three to seven days each (R.39), and spoke with 
her at least monthly. According to Mrs. Tuom's testimony, the 
parties discussed their future relationship and hoped for a 
reconciliation. They took no action to formally dissolve or 
terminate the marital relationship. 
Upon separation Mrs. Tuom lived initially with her 
brother and then with her sister in Idaho. At no time did she 
create any extra-marital relationship, nor did she live with 
another person of the opposite sex. Between June 13, 1980, the 
date Mrs. Tuom separated from her husband while a resident of 
Oregon, and September 1981, the date of his death, Daniel Tuom 
had contributed to his wife the following support: 
(a) The sum of $1,500.00 cash in June 1980 (R.41); 
(b) The sum of $250.00 cash in October 1980 (R.41); 
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( R. -12); 
le) The sum of $100.00 cash in November ~980 (R.~2,; 
(di The use of his truck and other ?er3onal ?ropert; 
le) Othe[ adJ1•1onal ~one; and support on an 
as-needed basis, provided he could afford the same (R.43); and 
(f) The use of other personal property acquired 
during the marriage. 
Upon Mrs. Tuom's arrival in Nampa, Idaho, she became 
enrolled at Boise State College and obtained employment earnin3 
a net income of approximately $550.00 to $600.00 per month. 
(R. 44, 46.) 
Against this income, Mrs. Tuom had the following 
expenditures: 
House payment (rent as of date of death) - $260.00 to 
$280.00 per month; 
Home maintenance - $50.00 per month; 
Home insurance - $10.00 per month; 
Gas - $80.00 per month; 
Electricity - $35.00 to $40.00 per month; 
Water - $15.00 to $17.00 per month; 
House taxes - $25.00 per month; 
Auto insurance - $75.00 per month; 
Schooling - $67.00 per month ($400.00 per semester); 
Auto gas - $60.00 per month; 
Auto repair - $20.00 per month; 
Food - $100.00 per month; 
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Drugs - $10.00 per month; 
Doctor and dentist bills - $20.00 per month. 
TOTAL: $831.00 per month. 
In addition to the money given her by her husband, and 
in order to temporarily support her needs, Mrs. Tuom's sister 
moved in with her to help offset household costs. At best, 
this would reduce her own requirements, but only as long as she 
relied upon the charity of her sister. 
At the time of his death, Daniel Tuom's wages were 
$8.00 per hour. He worked an average of 12 hours per day, six 
days per week. (R.l.) Daniel Tuom's weekly gross income 
approximated $704.00, more than four times Mrs. Tuom's earning 
ability. 
The Administrative Law Judge properly found that a 
common law marriage did exist between Daniel and Donnita Tuom, 
and the same was never formally terminated. ( R.142.) The 
State finally conceded this fact, but took the position that 
Daniel Tuom's unilateral action terminated the marriage even 
though no lawful proceeding in any state was instituted. 
The unilateral action of Daniel Tuom, relied upon by 
the State Fund to deny petitioner's claims, arose out of 
Daniel's illicit relationship with Arlene Browning whom he had 
met in Oregon and began living with in Vernal, Utah in 
•·:•pr·>x imately March 1981. (R.109.) Arlene's move to Utah 
·p~ed Daniel's by three months. During their cohabitation, 
~ only apparent reason Arlene Browning purported to be the 
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wife of Daniel Tuom was for the collection of life insurance 
benefits upon his death. (R.118, 120.) Petitioner contends 
that Arlene unilaterally adopted the status of wife when Daniel 
was taken to the hospital after the industrial accident of 
August 1981. (R.116.) Arlene Browning admitted that she did 
not marry Daniel Tuom "in the eyes of society'', 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE 
OF DECEDENT. 
It is clear from the factual evidence elicted at the 
hearing, as well as the finding of the Administrative Law 
Judge, that the petitioner is, in fact, the surviving spouse of 
the deceased employee. 
The marital relationship was initially created in the 
State of Idaho, which recognizes common law marriages. Section 
32-201 of the Idaho Code provides: 
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a 
civil contract, to which the consent of parties 
capable of making it is necessary. Consent 
alone will not constitute marriage; it must be 
followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual 
assumption of marital rights, duties or 
obligations. 
Section 32-202 of the Idaho Code further provides that: 
Consent to and subsequent consummation of 
marriage may be manifested in any form, and may 
be proved under the same general rules of 
evidence as facts in other cases. 
The facts in the instant matter demonstrate that 
consent was freely and voluntarily given between Donnita arid 
Daniel Tuom; that a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties 
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and obligations was acknowledgd (R.19); that the couple held 
•hemselves out as man and wife continuously since 1971, both 
Jsing the name of Tuom, filing joint tax returns (Group Exhibit 
\-11; purchasing property held in joint ownership (Exhibits A-3, 
4, 5, 11), operating joint checking and savings accounts 
'.Exhibits A-6, 12), and generally acting as man and wife. See 
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Johnson, 103 Id. 122, 645 P.2d 
356 (1982); Hamby v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94 Id. 794, 498 P.2d 
1267 ( 1972). 
After moving to the State of Virginia, which does not 
statutorily recognize common law marriage, but arguably will 
give full faith and credit to the recognized relationship 
created in the State of Idaho, the parties moved back to the 
State of Idaho where they continued their marital relationship. 
Oregon, the Tuoms' last marital residence, recognized the 
marital relationship created in the State of Idaho. See Boykin 
v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 355 P.2d 724 (Ore. 
1960); Walker v. Hildenbrand, 410 P.2d 244 (Ore. 1966); Johnson 
v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 581 P.2d 108 (Ore. App. 1978). 
Donnita and Daniel Tuom separated, without dissolving 
their marriage, prior to Daniel's move to the State of Utah in 
~arch 1981. In Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 P.2d 696 
rutah 1935), this Court recognized the possibility that a common 
l>w marriage, consummated in a state where such marriages are 
'\ i j, would in fact be valid in the State of Utah. !Q_. at 
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697. see also, Loughren v. Loughren, 292 U.S. 216, 54 s.ct. 684 
( 19 34). 
Respondent State Insurance Fund argues that despite th~ 
admitted common law marital relationship, Daniel Tuom absolvea 
that relationship by his unilateral actions and misdeeds. 
Responent's argument is not well founded in public policy and 
lacks statutory or judicial support. This Court, in Hilton v. 
Roylance, 69 Pac. 660 (Utah 1902), settled that precise 
contention long ago: 
so the marriage relation differs from other 
contractual relations in that, when the status 
is once created, the state becomes an interested 
party, and thereafter the marriage, with the 
rights and duties assigned by the law of 
matrimony, is not subject, as to its 
continuance, dissolution or effects, to the mere 
intention and pleasure of the contracting 
parties. The marriage, with its privileges, 
obligations, rights and duties which are or may 
be assigned by the law of matrimony for the 
establishment of families and the multiplication 
and education of humankind, continues during the 
life of the parties, and no dissolution of the 
status can be effected simply by the mutual 
consent or agreement of the parties. It is 
regulated and controlled, and can be dissolved 
only through the sovereign power of the state 
whenever justice to either or both parties or 
the welfare of the public demands it. Id. at 
663. ~ 
The major issue in contention at the hearing of 
this matter was appropriately and correctly decided by 
the Administrative Law Judge: Donnita Tuom was the 
surviving spouse of Daniel Lawrence Tuom at the date of 
his death. 
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II. PETITIONER, AS SURVIVING SPOUSE, IS A 
DEPENDENT OF THE DECEDENT BY OPERATION 
OF LAW. 
The question of dependency of a surviving spouse has 
~~en controlled, since 1917, by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-71, which 
~r~v1des, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
( 1) 
(2) For purposes of payment to be made 
under subsection (2)(b)(i) of section 35-1-68, 
a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed to 
be wholly dependent upon a spouse with whom he 
or she lived at the time of the employee's death. 
In 1979, the Utah legislature deviated from the 
"living with" standard by adopting a modification to §35-1-68 
which eliminated the "living with" standard and provided any 
surviving spouse a conclusive presumption of dependency for a 
period of six years from the date of death. Chap. 138, §3, 
Laws of Utah (1979). That section, 35-1-68, Utah Code Ann., 
clearly provides as follows: 
..• (2) In ca3e injury causes death within the 
period of six years from the date of the accident, 
the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the 
burial expenses of the deceased as provided in 
section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the 
amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) •• 
(b)(i) If there are wholly dependent 
persons at the time of death, the payment by the 
employer or insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
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per week and not less than a minimum of $45.00 per 
week plus $5.00 for a dependent spouse and $5.00 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of 18. 
(v) For purposes of anv depe~dency 
determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased 
employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly 
dependent for a six-year period from the date of death 
of the employee. This presumption shall not apply 
after the initial six-year period and, in determining 
the then existing annual income of the surviving 
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any 
federal social security death benefits received by 
that surviving spouse. 
A clear and unambiguous reading of §35-1-68 dispenses 
with any questions of surviving spousal dependency occurring 
within six years from the date of death, rendering §35-1-71(2) 
a redundant provision. For unknown reasons, however, §35-1-71 
(2) was not modified to be consistent with the conclusive 
presumption provided by §35-1-68. 
Notwithstanding that the inconsistency may or may not 
be due to legislative oversight, this Court has found that: 
when a person is confronted with inconsistent 
statutes, by one of which he would be subject to 
duties or restraint, and by the other he would be 
exempt therefrom, he is entitled to the benefit 
of the statute most favorable to his freedom of 
action. 
Basin Flying Service. v. Pub. Serv. Cornn., 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah 1975). Section 35-1-68, by not imposing a "living with" 
standard, is most favorable to petitioner and more consistent 
with a liberal construction of the Worker's Compensation Act to 
provide benefits, and thus should be accorded preference over 
-10-
)35-1-71. 
Moreover, it is submitted that judicial construction 
•f legislative acts should give greater weight to the more 
recent and more specific pronouncement of the legislature. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah, 1980); 2 
J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, §§4703, 
5201, 5204 (3d ed. 1943). Thus, the conclusive presumption 
granted under §35-1-68, the most recent and specific 
legislative provision, is applicable to all surviving spouses 
irrespective of their cohabitation. Indeed, many states have 
adopted such standards in recognition of a spouse's loss. See 
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §62, et seq. (1976) 
(hereinafter cited as Larson's). 
It is unreasonable and unjust to deprive a lawful 
spouse of monetary compensation for the loss of her mate simply 
because she does not live with her mate at the time of death. 
The right to sue for such loss, having been legislatively 
replaced by a specific schedule of benefits, compels a 
construction of the statute that would preserve the right of a 
spouse to recover for a death loss. This Court has said that 
rules of law shall be so interpreted and applied to the 
variegated problems which arise that they will comport with 
reason and do justice in the given situation." Young v. 
~-'~· 433 P.2d 846, 847 (Utah 1967). 
A surviving spouse not limited to the exclusive remedy 
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of worker's compensation clearly could sue at cnmmon law for 
more than loss of income alone: to-wit, less c)f community, 
emotional support, etc. f':...drJ1 t i•'n,1 l l J', 1 sp1;use 1.-./0 1~ -J nr-t :.'SP 
her standing to sue by reason of temporary separation. One 
must question whether a surviving spouse, who is not entitled 
to recover worker's compensation benefits simply because she 
was not a "live in" dependent, could regain her standing to sue 
the employer for negligence in causing her mate's death. 
Finally, the term "conclusive presumption", as used i~ 
§35-1-68, is a phrase of legal art well known to 
practitioners. Black's Law Dictionary defines its import as 
"putting an end to the factual inquiry: final; irrebuttable: 
decisive and beyond dispute". A conclusive presumption is, 
thus, an irrebuttable presumption and of legal effect which is 
not permitted to be overcome by any proof of fact otherwise. 
Earley v. Industrial Commission, 265 P.2d 390, 391 (Utah 
1953). As surviving spouse, Donni ta Tuom is conclusively 
presumed to be wholly dependent by operation of law under 
§35-1-68. 
I II. PETITIONER WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY "LIVING 
WITH" DECEDENT AT THE DATE OF DEATH. 
Assuming, arguendo, that §35-1-71(2) controls the 
definition of dependency, irrespective of the more specific 
statement located within §35-1-68, the phri'lse "livinq with" 1n 
§35-1-71(2) should be given a liberal constructive ~eC1n1nn 
is an established principle that a remedial civil stcit11te is 
-12-
tc be accorded liberal construction in order to accomplish the 
0urpose for which it was established. 3 Sands, Sutherland on 
,•,~utory Construction, §60.01 (4th ed. 1974). The purpose of 
c~e remedial workman's compensation legislation is to provide 
benefits to claimants. Construing the phrase "living with" to 
mean something other than a narrow concept of actual 
cohabitation at the time of death furthers such purpose. 
This Court has recognized a liberal constructive 
meaning of the phrase "living with" by deeming a wife to be 
"living with" her husband, whether actual or not, until the 
marital relationship has been so deliberately severed that the 
wife obviously no longer looks to the husband for support. 
Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307, 311 
11932). See additional case citations, Larson's, §62.40. 
Where the separation of the marital relationship is 
due to the husband's misconduct or desertion, the wife is 
constructively deemed to be "living with" him and is entitled 
to the benefits of the husband on the theory that he remains 
legally liable for her support. Ranger Insurance Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz. App. 45, 485 P.2d 869 (1971). 
Cruelty on the part of the husband justifiably causing the wife 
·~ leave him is treated the same as desertion by the husband 
•~rl ~oes not break the relationship of "living with" the 
I I I '~ r) 1. r1 rl . Larson's, §62.40. 
The issue in many cases appears to turn upon whether 
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or not the separation was voluntary. Llewelyn v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 31, 202 P.2d 160, 162 (1949); Diaz v. 
Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307, 311 (1932). In 
the instant matter, it cannot be said that Mrs. Tuom 
voluntarily separated from her husband as the reasons for that 
separation were due to the husband's improper acts relating to 
another woman. Mrs. Tuom would have been justified in seeking 
a divorce, but her uncontradicted testimony was that she 
desired to continue the relationship of man and wife and hoped 
their differences would be reconciled. The mere fact that the 
husband continued to see and live with another woman in an 
illicit relationship should not act as a forfeiture of Mrs. 
Tuom's statutory rights. In Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 80 
Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307 (1932), the court noted: 
Let it not be minimized nor pushed aside that 
the rights of the dependents specified in the 
statute were created for their benefit inde-
pendently of the rights of the employee, so 
and as the authorities teach, they may not 
become a public charge, and such rights should 
not be denied them, unless clearly forfeited 
or abrogated by them. Id. at 313. 
See also, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Ellis, 99 Ga. 
App. 486, 109 S.E.2d 70 (1959); Harge v. Leonard Bell & Son, 12 
A.2d 568, 206 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1960); Clark v. Industrial 
Commission, 10 Ariz. App. 486, 460 P.2d 22 (1969). 
Mrs. Tuom supplied significant, substantial and 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrating: (a) that she is the 
common law wife of the decedent and had lived with him as man 
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and wife for ten years, relying upon his support; (b) that said 
r2lationship was never dissolved; (c) that she involuntarily 
left the presence of her husband by reason of her husband's 
infidelity, and did not abrogate any future rights for the 
r0llection of support or statutory benefits; (d) she had hoped 
for a reconciliation; and (e) that during the course of the 
separation, she spoke frequently and visited with her husband, 
while at the same time enjoying and relying upon the financial 
support provided her during separation. These facts are 
sufficient to demonstrate that Mrs. Tuom constructively lived 
with the decedent, Daniel Lawrence Tuom, and accordingly should 
be entitled to the presumptions of §35-1-71(2) and the benefits 
of Utah workmen's compensation laws without a specific 
demonstration of dependency in fact. [This demonstration also 
supports a finding of dependency in fact. Diaz v. Industrial 
Commission, Id at 313.] 
As surviving spouse, Donnita Tuom should be 
constructively deemed to have been living with the decedent at 
the time of his death and thus entitled to the presumption 
offered under §35-1-71. 
IV. PETITIONER WAS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT UPON 
DECEDENT FOR SUPPORT AT THE TIME OF 
HIS DEATH. 
Assuming Mrs. Tuom is not entitled to claim the 
presumptions of the sections above cited, she has demonstrated 
·"~!ear and convincing evidence that she is in fact dependent 
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upon Daniel Tuom for support, and was so dependent as of the 
date of his death. 
As a general rule, many factors must be regarded to 
prove or disprove dependency: the actual receipt of support, a 
legal obligation of support, the existence of a relationship 
during separation demonstrating the possibility of a 
continuation of the marital relationship, or the wife's 
acquiescence of the separation tantamount to a repudiation of 
future support. Most authorities agree that a claimant need 
not demonstrate that without decedent's contributions, she 
would have lacked the necessities of life. See Larson's, at 
§63.11. While many states hold that a legal obligation alone 
cannot support a finding of dependency, a growing number of 
states have adopted the contraview, and Utah appears to among 
those jurisdictions as evidenced by the recent change in 
§35-1-68 cited above. See also, Llewelyn v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 31, 202 P.2d 160 (1949), and Larson's, at 
§63.31 (n.55). 
The specific finding of the Administrative Law Judge, 
which claimant submits to be totally unsupported by the 
evidence elicited, and the Administrative Law Judge's 
conclusions are set forth as follows: 
In accordance with the statute [35-1-71] . 
the Administrative Law Judge finds that the appli-
cant, Donnita Tuom, is not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits, in that she was not living 
with the deceased at the time of his death, in 
fact, he was living with another woman at that 
time. The decedent provided no support for the 
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applicant, nor was there any indication that he 
intended to provide any support for her since the 
time of her separation. (R.143-144.) 
While the Administrative Law Judge is the finder of 
~act and normally his views would not be questioned on appeal, 
neither is he allowed to disregard or disbelieve uncontroverted 
evidence. "The Commission was in duty bound to fairly and im-
partially consider all the evidence relating to a material 
issue, and was not permitted to single out some portion of it 
and give it undue weight to the exclusion of other evidence of 
equal importance . • . The Commission may not arbitrarily or 
capriciously disregard evidence or disbelieve testimony.• ~ 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 13 P.2d at 312. 
Contrasting the uncontroverted testimony provided by 
the applicant against the Administrative Law Judge's finding 
aptly demonstrates the arbitrary and capricious nature of his 
ruling: 
The decedent provided no support to the 
applicant. • 
The Administrative Law Judge totally disregards $1,500.00 cash 
given applicant in June 1980 (R.41); $250.00 in October 1980 
(R.41); $100.00 in November 1980 (R.42); and use of personal 
and other property during the separation (R.42-43). 
. . . Nor was there any indication he intended 
to provide any support since the time of her 
separation. (R.144.) 
1nt only was actual support provided to Mrs. Tuom within the 
'i 1d of five months after the date of separation, but 
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substantial testimony recalled several visits of up to seven 
days each, ~onthly telephone calls and continuing use of 
personal property considered by the decedent to be his own 
personal property. The most interesting aspect of this factual 
finding is the legal conclusion implied by it, to-wit: a 
forfeiture of Mrs. Tuom's statutory rights based upon the 
irresponsible avoidance of legal and moral obligations of 
support to Donnita Tuom, his wife of ten years duration. This 
Court, in McGarry v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 63 Utah 81, 
222 Pac. 592, 594 (1923), emphasized that the legal obligation 
of support to those depending upon the person owing that 
obligation is a material factor in determining dependency. 
Also cited with approval by the Court in McGarry was the case 
of Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 Pac. 72 
(1922): 
But just as the existence of the marital status 
does not of itself prove dependency, so that lack 
of actual support by the husband does not of it-
self negative dependency. The failure to support 
is only one circumstance for consideration. The 
reasons for it, the length of its continuance, 
the mutual attitude and means of the parties, 
the probable resumption of duty, and other similar 
matters may have a distinct bearing on the subject. 
If dependency were determined only by the fact of 
contribution to support, a wife and children might 
be dependent one week and cease to be the next 
according to the caprice of the husband and father. 
Such a theory lacks support from authority. 204 
Pac. at 73. 
Just as the Court was able to speculate as to the 
probable outcome of a petition to modify a support obligation 
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~ontained in a decree of separate maintenance in the case of 
:,tewel'!n v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 31, 202 P. 2d 160 
:H91, it is argued that Mrs. Tuom would have been entitled to 
receive an award of support had she sought the same from the 
district courts of Idaho or Utah. Daniel Tuom earned in excess 
of $700.00 ~week against Donnita's approximately $600.00 ~ 
month earnings; Donnita expended in excess of $250.00 per month 
in actual expenditures over her earnings and relied upon the 
support received from her family and sister in order to 
maintain her level of needed support. It is submitted that a 
district court would have evaluated the respective positions of 
the parties in the event a divorce was sought, and after fairly 
determining obligations, property distribution and earning 
ability, a court would have ordered Mr. Tuom pay support to 
Mrs. tuom, finding her to be dependent. It is inappropriate 
for the Administrative Law Judge to hold that simply because 
Daniel Tuom paid no regular support, he therefore owed no 
support. The legislature could not have intended to exclude 
from benefits a surviving wife who had the misfortune of being 
neglected earlier by an irresponsible husband. See Rocky Mtn. 
nelicopter, Inc. v. carter, 652 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah 1982) (the 
court used similar language to find dependency of neglected 
n in <H chi 1 d re n ) . 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial 
J111miss ion of Utah committed the following errors of law in 
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this matter: 
1. Failure to consider the conclusive presumption of 
dependency offered under §35-1-68; 
2. ~ailure to properly applj the presumptions of 
§35-1-71 in that Donnita Tuom should be constructively deemed 
to be "living with" decedent at the time of his death; 
3. Acting arbitrarily and capriciously by completely 
disregarding uncontroverted evidence of actual dependency; and 
4. Denying petitioner's claim based upon findings 
which are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Accordingly, the Commission's order denying benefits 
should be reversed and remanded for the purpose of awarding 
death benefits to Donnita Tuom as the lawful and wholly 
dependent spouse of Daniel Lawrence Tuom, deceased. 
;,,;;/< 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _f2_::_ day of July, 1983. 
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